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LET THE KIDS PLAY: HOW COLLEGE ATHLETES CAN USE
CALIFORNIA’S PROHIBITION ON NONCOMPETE
CLAUSES TO CIRCUMVENT THE NCAA’S
YEAR-IN-RESIDENCE RULE
MATT STRAUSER*
I. INTRODUCTION
A new era had dawned for the University of Southern Califor-
nia (“USC”) football program.  The introduction of Kliff Kingsbury
as offensive coordinator, and the high-profile high school players
he helped recruit to campus, promised to elevate USC’s football
program to heights it had not achieved since the mid-2000s.1  How-
ever, when the National Football League’s Arizona Cardinals hired
Kingsbury as their head coach on January 8, 2019, that promising
new era abruptly ended little more than a month after it started.2
With Kingsbury’s departure, recruits who signed with USC to
play in his high-octane offense faced a difficult choice—remain
committed to USC and play for an offensive coordinator that did
not recruit them or transfer to another school and play for coaches
that did.  This may seem like an easy decision.  Transferring to an-
other school eliminates the risk associated with playing for coaches
* J.D., William & Mary Law School, 2019; M.A., University of Mississippi, 2016;
B.A., Princeton University, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Drew Larsen for
his encouragement throughout the writing process and my wife, Jessie, for her
constant support.  All opinions, and errors, are my own.
1. See Greg Beacham, USC Lands Kliff Kingsbury as Helton’s Offensive Coordinator,
AP NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/e1005422766347739655d314
d30b35b9 [https://perma.cc/E2CY-2Q9J]; see also Dina Colunga, 2019 USC Com-
mits Kedon Slovis and Jude Wolfe Speak on Kliff Kingsbury Hire, CONQUEST CHRONICLES
(Dec. 5, 2018 11:15 AM), https://www.conquestchronicles.com/recruiting/2018/
12/5/18127654/2019-usc-commits-kedon-slovis-and-jude-wolfe-speak-on-kliff-
kingsbury-hire [https://perma.cc/L8X7-2WRB].
2. See Josh Weinfuss, Cardinals Give Kliff Kingsbury Four-Year Deal to Be New Head
Coach, ESPN (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/25715541/ari
zona-cardinals-hire-kliff-kingsbury [https://perma.cc/GXN6-2FH5].
(1)
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that you do not know and who may not put you on the field, either
because they do not think highly of your skillset or because your
skillset does not match the offensive or defensive scheme they em-
ploy.  Yet, these USC recruits could not make their decision based
exclusively on the coaches they expected to roam the USC sidelines
that fall.  They also needed to consider the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association’s (“NCAA”) transfer rules, particularly the so-
called year-in-residence rule.3  The year-in-residence rule requires
baseball, basketball, football,4 and men’s ice hockey players that
transfer from one Division I school to another to complete one full
academic year at their new institution before they can compete in
intercollegiate athletics.5  The rule essentially serves as a one-year
suspension for these athletes.  Furthermore, its applicability to only
five high-revenue, high-profile sports demonstrates that the rule
primarily exists to allow the NCAA to limit the power of its most
exploited laborers, even while it allows well-compensated coaches
to sell their labor without constraints.
Bru McCoy, a highly-touted high-school football player who
committed to USC to play for Kingsbury, faced an unenviable
choice—remain at USC despite Kingsbury’s absence or transfer to a
different school where the year-in-residence rule might make him
ineligible to play during the 2019 season.6  Ultimately, despite the
year-in-residence rule, McCoy transferred to the University of Texas
and petitioned the NCAA for a waiver that would grant him imme-
diate eligibility.7  Despite transferring to Texas less than a month
after formally committing to USC, McCoy’s fate rested in the
NCAA’s hands.8  McCoy eventually transferred back to USC in May
3. See Transfer Terms, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.
org/student-athletes/current/transfer-terms [https://perma.cc/KKX2-HUCX]
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
4. The year-in-residence rule applies only to Division I football players who
compete in the Football Bowl Subdivision (“FBS”). Id.
5. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, DIVISION I MANUAL, 183–85, availa-
ble at https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008 [https://perma.cc/
5EV5-8UR9] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020); Transfer Terms, supra note 3.
6. See J. Brady McCollough, USC Freshman Receiver Bru McCoy Enters Transfer
Portal, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019, 6:55 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/usc/
la-sp-usc-mccoy-transfer-20190124-story.html [https://perma.cc/A8Z6-35AG].
7. See Wescott Eberts, Bru McCoy Discusses His Time at Texas as Waiver Optimism
Grows, MSN (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/ncaafb/bru-mc
coy-discusses-his-time-at-texas-as-waiver-optimism-grows/ar-BBV17Pi [https://
perma.cc/SRV2-KULC].
8. See Paul Kasabian, Bru McCoy Reportedly to Begin Classes at Texas After Transfer-
ring from USC, BLEACHER REPORT (Jan. 25, 2019), https://bleacherreport.com/arti
cles/2817560-bru-mccoy-reportedly-to-begin-classes-at-texas-after-transferring-from-
usc [https://perma.cc/9AY2-HK2M].
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of 2019, where he once again faced the prospect of missing a year
of competition due to the year-in-residence rule.9
Optimistic USC fans might have pointed to the NCAA’s 2019
decision to grant an eligibility waiver to Justin Fields, a high-profile
quarterback who transferred from the University of Georgia to
Ohio State University as evidence that the NCAA would grant Mc-
Coy’s waiver petition.10  However, while the Fields decision ostensi-
bly demonstrated the NCAA’s willingness to relax enforcement of
the year-in-residence rule, the NCAA still jealously guards its ability
to control how and when football players like McCoy can transfer to
other schools.11  Indeed, in June 2019, in response to an increase in
waiver requests from players like Fields and McCoy, the NCAA an-
nounced updated transfer guidelines that would make it harder for
players to receive eligibility waivers.12  The year prior, the NCAA
successfully defended an antitrust challenge to the year-in-resi-
dence rule when the Seventh Circuit found that the rule “pre-
serve[s] the amateur character of college athletics,” despite
reducing the benefits that players might receive if the rule did not
exist.13
9. See J. Brady McCollough, Bru McCoy Is Leaving Texas and Intends to Return to
USC, L.A. TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/sports/usc/la-sp-bru-
mccoy-usc-texas-transfer-20190531-story.html [https://perma.cc/BXR9-5R36].  In
October 2019, USC announced that McCoy would not play at all in the 2019 sea-
son, making his waiver requests moot. See Rob Goldberg, USC’s Former 5-Star WR
Bru McCoy Out for Season, BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 29, 2019), https://bleacherre
port.com/articles/2860427-usc-wr-bru-mccoy-out-for-season [https://perma.cc/4C
YP-MFRR].
10. See Emily Caron, NCAA Grants Ohio State Quarterback Justin Fields Immediate
Eligibility, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.si.com/college-foot
ball/2019/02/08/justin-fields-immediate-eligibility-ohio-state-transfer-georgia-
transfer-ncaa-decision [https://perma.cc/T8U5-3CJ5].
11. See Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018) (where the
NCAA successfully defended the year-in-residence rule as a “presumptively
procompetitive” eligibility rule that should not face federal antitrust scrutiny).
12. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Council Adjusts Transfer Waiver Guidelines, Ad-
dresses Other Topics, NCAA (June 26, 2019, 11:26 AM) https://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/media-center/news/council-adjusts-transfer-waiver-guidelines-ad
dresses-other-topics [https://perma.cc/YJX5-98RT]; see also Dan Wolken, NCAA
Tightens Transfer Guidelines, Limits Players Gaining Immediate Eligibility, USA TODAY
(June 26, 2019, 9:44 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/colum
nist/dan-wolken/2019/06/26/ncaas-changes-transfer-guidelines-limit-immediate-
eligibility/1569260001/ [https://perma.cc/7YS4-UV6G].
13. Deppe, 893 F.3d at 499, 500.  The plaintiff in Deppe, an erstwhile punter at
Northern Illinois University (“NIU”), challenged the year-in-residence rule as an
unlawful restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 499.  The NIU
coaches had promised the plaintiff, Peter Deppe, a scholarship. Id.  Unfortunately
for Deppe, those coaches left NIU and the new coach offered a scholarship to
another punter. Id.  Coaches at the University of Iowa told Deppe that they
wanted to offer him a scholarship, but only if he could play immediately. Id. at
3
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Antitrust challenges to the year-in-residence rule have repeat-
edly failed, but some scholars have argued student-athletes might
achieve better outcomes by bringing such suits in a more favorable
jurisdiction, like the Ninth Circuit.14  This paper agrees that stu-
dent-athletes, like Bru McCoy, should look westward to challenge
the year-in-residence rule.  However, McCoy and other student-ath-
letes who signed their national letter of intent or scholarship agree-
ment in California should not challenge the year-in-residence rule
on antitrust grounds.  Instead, they should attack it as a noncom-
pete agreement that violates section 16600 of the California Busi-
ness Professions Code (“section 16600”).15
This paper argues that national letters of intent and athletic
scholarship agreements create a contractual relationship between a
student-athlete and his or her university.16  When a student-athlete
signs that contract, he or she agrees to abide by NCAA bylaws, in-
cluding the year-in-residence rule.17  However, the year-in-residence
rule violates section 16600’s prohibition on noncompete agree-
ments because it prevents a student-athlete from immediately com-
peting in intercollegiate athletics.18  This statute and California’s
“settled public policy in favor of open competition”19 give college
athletes who sign national letters of intent or scholarship agree-
ments in California a way to successfully circumvent the year-in-resi-
dence rule.
This paper proceeds in three parts.  Part II outlines the con-
tours of section 16600, which prohibits noncompete agreements.
500.  Deppe sued the NCAA hoping to become immediately eligible at Iowa. Id.
However, the Seventh Circuit held that “the year-in-residence requirement is
plainly an eligibility rule” that is “entitled to a procompetitive presumption.” Id. at
502.  Thus, “Deppe’s Sherman Act challenge to the NCAA’s year-in-residence by-
law fail[ed] on the pleadings.” Id. at 504.
14. See Cameron Miller, Go West, Young Man: Why the NCAA’s Transfer Regula-
tions Can Be Defeated in the Ninth Circuit, ARIZ. ST. U. SPORTS & ENT. L. J.: BLOG (Feb.
17, 2019), http://asuselj.org/why-the-ncaas-transfer-regulations-can-be-defeated-
in-the-ninth-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/M5LM-VU8U].
15. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019) (“Except as provided in this
chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 834 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (noting that NCAA “constitution and bylaws [are] explicitly incor-
porated by reference into the financial aid agreements executed by” student-
athletes); NCAA Division I Student-Athlete Statement, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS’N, available at https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/d1/2019-20D1
Comp_Form19-1a-StudentAthleteStatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3R3-B72T]
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020); DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 5, at 6 (R. 3.1.2.4.).
18. See infra Part IV.
19. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 290 (Cal. 2008).
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Part III explains why both national letters of intent and athletic
scholarship agreements are contracts.  Finally, Part IV explains why
section 16600 should apply to and ultimately invalidate the year-in-
residence rule as a void noncompete agreement.
II. SECTION 16600 PROHIBITS NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS
Section 16600 of the California Business Professions Code
states that, “[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every contract by
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”20  California
“courts have consistently affirmed that section 16600 evinces a set-
tled legislative policy in favor of open competition and employment
mobility.”21  Additionally, the state legislature and the California
Supreme Court both “generally condemn[ ] noncompetition agree-
ments” to “ensure[ ] ‘that every citizen shall retain the right to pur-
sue any lawful employment and enterprise of their choice.’”22
In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP,23 a “landmark” case inter-
preting section 16600, the California Supreme Court “affirmed that
specific statutory exceptions are the only way around section
16600.”24  There the court refused to adopt a “rule of reasonable-
ness” standard when evaluating noncompetition agreements be-
cause section 16600’s “plain meaning” prohibits even reasonable
limits “on an employee’s ability to practice his or her voca-
tion. . . .”25  The court also explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of section 16600, which allowed noncompetition
agreements that only narrowly restrained an employee’s ability to
engage in his or her vocation.26  The court held that “[s]ection
16600 is unambiguous, and if the Legislature intended the statute
to apply only to restraints that were unreasonable or overbroad, it
could have included language to that effect.”27  The court also
20. BUS. & PROF. § 16600.  The three subsequent sections of the California
Business and Professions Code permit noncompete agreements, “in the sale or
dissolution of corporations, partnerships, and limited liability corporations.” See
Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290–91 (internal citations omitted).
21. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 291.
22. Id. (quoting Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (1994)).
23. 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008).
24. Jame P. Mascaro, Non-Competition Agreements in California: The Fine Line Be-
tween Good and Bad, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Jan. 2016, at 25, available at http://
www.mascarolaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Jame-Mascaro-Orange-
County-Lawyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/DPE2-JL98].
25. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 291–92.
26. See id. at 292–93.
27. Id. at 293.
5
Stauser: Let the Kids Play: How College Athletes Can Use California's Proh
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 6  2-MAR-20 11:59
6 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27: p. 1
alerted future litigants that only the state legislature had the re-
sponsibility and power to craft exceptions to section 16600’s gen-
eral prohibition on non-compete agreements.28
III.  NATIONAL LETTERS OF INTENT AND ATHLETIC SCHOLARSHIP
AGREEMENTS ARE CONTRACTS
A student-athlete can use section 16600 to overturn the
NCAA’s year-in-residence rule only if an enforceable contract exists
between the student-athlete and his or her college or university.29
Two types of agreements between a student-athlete and his or her
college or university could provide the contractual relationship nec-
essary to challenge the enforceability of the year-in-residence rule
under section 16600—a national letter of intent or a scholarship
agreement.
A. National Letters of Intent
When a high school student formally commits to a NCAA Divi-
sion I or II college or university, he or she signs a national letter of
intent.30  A national letter of intent obligates the student-athlete “to
attend the institution listed on the [national letter of intent] for
one academic year in exchange for that institution awarding athlet-
ics financial aid for one academic year.”31  The NCAA recognizes
these letters as contracts between the student-athlete and the
school.32  If a student signs a national letter of intent but leaves the
institution listed on the letter before completing one academic year
at that institution, then the student-athlete “los[es] . . . one season
of competition in all sports” and must spend a year-in-residence at
28. See id. (“We reject Andersen’s contention that we should adopt a narrow-
restraint exception to section 16600 and leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses,
either to relax the statutory restrictions or adopt additional exceptions to the pro-
hibition-against-restraint rule under section 16600.”).
29. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
30. Recruiting, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/stu-
dent-athletes/future/recruiting [https://perma.cc/PU8E-GB2G] (last visited Jan.
28, 2020).
31. NLI Binding Agreement FAQs, NAT’L LETTER INTENT, http://www.national
letter.org/frequentlyAskedQuestions/bindingAgreement.html [https://perma.cc
/XC92-ELYA] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
32. See Recruiting, supra note 30.  Of course, the NCAA does not recognize R
these contracts as employment contracts because it does not recognize student-
athletes as employees. See Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to Union Proposal, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/press-releases/ncaa-responds-union-proposal [https://perma.cc/767D-
USKX] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (“Student-athletes are not employees, and their
participation in college sports is voluntary.”).
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his or her new school.33  Because the NCAA concedes that national
letters of intent are contracts, section 16600 applies to national let-
ters of intent signed in California.
B. Athletic Scholarship Agreements
The NCAA describes an athletic scholarship as “an agreement
between the school and the student-athlete with expectations on
both sides,” namely that the student-athlete will compete for the
school in exchange for financial aid during the term of the agree-
ment.34  Because student-athletes and the college or university they
attend make “an agreement . . . with expectations on both sides,”35
some scholars have said that “[s]tudent-athletes enter into a direct
contractual relationship with their schools.”36  However, the NCAA
maintains that, unlike national letters of intent, scholarship agree-
ments do not create a contractual relationship between a student-
athlete and his or her school because “the agreement is completely
separate from transfer regulations” and “[a] student-athlete may
choose to transfer at any time.”37  While the year-in-residence rule
undermines the NCAA’s claim that a student-athlete can “transfer
at any time,” a student-athlete challenging the year-in-residence
rule under section 16660 must prepare to prove that a scholarship
agreement is, in fact, a contract under California law.
Section 1549 of the California Civil Code defines a contract as
“an agreement to do or not do a certain thing.”38  Section 1550
identifies four essential elements of a contract: “1. Parties capable
of contracting; 2. Their consent; 3. A lawful object; and, 4. A suffi-
cient cause or consideration.”39  Scholarship agreements satisfy all
four of these elements.
33. NLI Penalty FAQs, NAT’L LETTER INTENT, http://www.nationalletter.org/
frequentlyAskedQuestions/nliPenalty.html [https://perma.cc/9LDN-YV9R] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2020.
34. Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20190404022123/ http://www.ncaa.org/
about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa [https://perma.cc/E2HG-DXXU].
35. Id.
36. See Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 287, 291 (2016).
37. See Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, supra note 34 (advertising
that a scholarship “agreement does not bind the student-athlete to the institution
any more than the current transfer rules—he or she may transfer during the term
of the award”).
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1549 (West 2019).
39. CIV. § 1550.
7
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1. Contractual Capacity
Section 1556 of the California Civil Code provides that “[a]ll
persons are capable of contracting, except minors, persons of un-
sound mind, and persons deprived of civil rights.”40  Notwithstand-
ing section 1556’s exception regarding the contractual capacity of
minors, section 6700 of the California Family Code declares that “a
minor may make a contract in the same manner as an adult,” sub-
ject to specific exceptions that do not apply to student-athletes sign-
ing a scholarship agreement.41  Thus, under typical circumstances,
the parties to a scholarship agreement have contractual capacity.42
Moreover, student-athletes sign a national letter of intent before they
sign a scholarship agreement.43  Therefore, the NCAA cannot plau-
sibly argue that student-athletes lack contractual capacity when they
sign a scholarship agreement, while also maintaining that they
somehow have contractual capacity when they sign their national
letter of intent a year prior.
2. Consent
Under California law, “[t]he consent of the parties to a con-
tract must be: 1. Free; 2. Mutual; and, 3. Communicated by each to
the other.”44  Under typical circumstances, both parties consent to
a scholarship agreement because neither party signs due to duress,
menace, fraud, undue influence, or mistake.45  Additionally, both
parties sign the agreement and the agreement communicates the
consent of each party to the other,46 satisfying the second and third
elements of contractual consent.47  Also, as a practical matter, a stu-
dent-athlete challenging the year-in-residence rule under section
40. CIV. § 1556. “A minor is an individual who is under 18 years of age.” CAL.
FAM. CODE § 6500 (West 2019).
41. FAM. § 6700.  The specific exceptions to the contractual capacity of mi-
nors pertain to power delegation, real property, personal property, and marriage
contracts. FAM. §§ 6700, 6701.  Additionally, a minor may “disaffirm” a contract
“before majority or within a reasonable time afterwards,” FAM. § 6710, but a stu-
dent-athlete challenging the year-in-residence rule under section 16600 would not
disaffirm the scholarship agreement.
42. This paper presumes that ordinarily neither the exception for persons of
unsound mind nor the exception for persons deprived of civil rights apply when a
student-athlete signs his or her scholarship agreement.
43. See Recruiting, supra note 30; Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA,
supra note 34.
44. CIV. § 1565.
45. See CIV. § 1567.
46. See Sample Athletic Financial Aid Agreement, supra note 17; Frequently Asked
Questions About the NCAA, supra note 34.
47. See CIV. § 1565.
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16600 will undoubtedly concede that he or she consented to the
scholarship agreement.
  3. Lawful Object and Consideration
The requirements that a contract have both a “lawful object”
and “sufficient . . . consideration” work together.48  An agreement
satisfies these elements if the party receiving consideration agrees
to do something lawful at the time of contracting and “possible and
ascertainable by the time the contract is to be performed.”49  Con-
tracts are lawful unless they are “[c]ontrary to an express provision
of law,” “the policy of express law,” or “good morals.”50  Giving stu-
dent-athletes athletic-related financial aid in exchange for playing a
sport at a particular school is not contrary to an express provision of
California law, the policy of an express California law, or good
morals.  Additionally, student-athletes agree to do something that
they can accomplish during the time by which the contract is to be
performed because they play college athletics for their institution
throughout the duration of the scholarship.  Furthermore, because
national letters of intent are contracts with similar terms to scholar-
ship agreements, the NCAA likely would not claim that an athletic
scholarship agreement is unlawful.51
Thus, a scholarship agreement satisfies all of the elements of a
contract if the promisor—the student-athlete in this case52—re-
ceives sufficient consideration for his or her promise to play a sport
at a school.53  Section 1605 of the California Civil Code defines
“good consideration” as “[a]ny benefit conferred, or agreed to be
conferred, upon the promisor, by any other person, to which the
promisor is not lawfully entitled . . . .”54  A student-athlete receives
48. See CIV. §§ 1550, 1595.
49. CIV. § 1596.
50. CIV. § 1667.
51. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
52. A court should not consider the college or university as the promisor be-
cause the college or university obligates itself to the student-athlete only after the
student-athlete promises to attend the college or university.  Therefore, the college
or university is the promisee because the student-athlete makes a promise to the
school.
53. See CIV.§ 1550.  In this context, “sufficient consideration” exclusively re-
fers to legally sufficient consideration, not just or fair consideration.  Indeed, it
seems clear that student-athletes, particularly those in revenue sports, do not re-
ceive fair compensation for their athletic contributions to colleges and universities.
See David Berri, Even When Allegedly Paid Illegally, NCAA Athletes Appear to Be Very
Underpaid, FORBES (Nov. 26, 2017, 3:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/david
berri/2017/11/26/even-when-allegedly-paid-illegally-ncaa-athletes-appear-to-be-
very-underpaid/#3a348203541a [https://perma.cc/X8U5-UYN9].
54. See CIV. § 1605.
9
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sufficient consideration for his or her promise to play a sport at a
school because the terms of a typical scholarship agreement give a
student-athlete athletic-related financial aid in exchange for com-
mitting to play at a college or university.55  Financial aid directly
benefits student-athletes by reducing or eliminating the cost of a
college education.56  Indeed, the NCAA maintains that “[a] college
education is the most rewarding benefit of the student-athlete expe-
rience.”57  Thus, scholarship agreements satisfy the fourth element
of a contract because student-athletes receive sufficient considera-
tion for their promise to attend a particular school because they
receive a valuable college education for free or at a discounted rate.
Because athletic scholarship agreements satisfy all four elements of
a contract under California law, a court should hold that an athletic
scholarship agreement is a contract.
IV. SECTION 16600 VOIDS THE NCAA’S YEAR-IN-RESIDENCE RULE
Once a student-athlete proves that a national letter of intent or
athletic scholarship agreement is a contract, he or she must demon-
strate that section 16600 voids the year-in-residence rule as an im-
permissible noncompete clause.  First, student-athlete plaintiffs
must show that the contract they signed with their school includes
the year-in-residence rule as a contract term.58  California courts
have held that the NCAA’s “constitution and bylaws [are] explicitly
incorporated by reference into the financial aid agreements” that
student-athletes sign.59  The NCAA Division I manual includes the
year-in-residence rule, so a student-athlete plaintiff should have lit-
tle trouble demonstrating that his or her letter of intent or scholar-
ship agreement includes the year-in-residence rule as a contract
term.60
The remainder of Part IV explains why section 16600 voids the
year-in-residence rule.  First, this Part argues that student-athletes
engage in a “lawful profession, trade, or business” when they par-
ticipate in college athletics.61  Part IV then shows that the year-in-
55. See Epstein & Anderson, supra note 36, at 291; Frequently Asked Questions R
About the NCAA, supra note 34.
56. See Scholarships, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/
student-athletes/future/scholarships [https://perma.cc/9ED7-CAXT] (last visited
Jan. 28, 2020).
57. Id.
58. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
59. Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 834 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
60. See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 5, at 183–85.
61. See infra Part IV.A.
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol27/iss1/1
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-MAR-20 11:59
2020] LET THE KIDS PLAY 11
residence rule restrains student-athletes from engaging in the busi-
ness of college athletics.62  Finally, this Part concludes by arguing
that the California state legislature should not create an exception
to section 16600 that protects the year-in-residence rule.63
A. NCAA Student-Athletes Engage in a Lawful Profession,
Trade, or Business When They Play College Sports
To circumvent the year-in-residence rule by using section
16600, student-athlete plaintiffs must demonstrate that they “en-
gag[e] in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind” when
they play their sport.64  As a matter of statutory interpretation,
courts “must follow [the] plain meaning” of a clear and unambigu-
ous statute.65  In Edwards, the California Supreme Court held that
“[s]ection 16600 is unambiguous” and applied its plain meaning.66
This binding precedent requires courts to examine section 16600’s
plain meaning to determine if student-athletes engage in a profes-
sion, trade, or business when they play a sport.67
1. College Athletics Are a Lawful Business
Although the California Business and Professions Code does
not define profession, trade, or business, student-athlete plaintiffs
can credibly argue that they engage in a business by participating in
the billion-dollar college sports industry.68  Such an argument com-
ports with section 16600’s broad terms that apply to “every con-
tract” that restrains “anyone” from “engaging in a lawful . . .
62. See infra Part IV.B.
63. See infra Part IV.C.
64. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
65. See, e.g., Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Serv., Inc., 30 P.3d 57, 60 (Cal. 2001); see
also Bodell Constr. Co. v. Trs. of Cal. St. Univ., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 450, 454 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 303–04 (Cal. 1988)) (“If
the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for
construction.”).
66. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291, 293 (Cal. 2008).
67. See, e.g., id. at 293; Torres, 30 P.3d at 60.
68. See, e.g., S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as originally
introduced) (hereinafter “Proposed Fair Pay to Play Act”), available at https://
legiscan.com/CA/text/SB206/id/1972267/California-2019-SB206-Amended.html
[https://perma.cc/47Z3-DH4W] (“California’s postsecondary educational institu-
tions that participate in intercollegiate athletics generate over seven hundred mil-
lion dollars (700,000,000) per year, which is revenue that would not exist without
the efforts of college athletes.”); see also Darren Rovell, NCAA Tops $1 Billion in
Revenue During 2016-17 School Year, ESPN (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.espn.com/
college-sports/story/_/id/22678988/ncaa-tops-1-billion-revenue-first [https://
perma.cc/X6BD-PNSX].
11
Stauser: Let the Kids Play: How College Athletes Can Use California's Proh
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 12  2-MAR-20 11:59
12 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27: p. 1
business of any kind . . . .”69  The dictionary defines “any” as “one or
more without specification or identification” and “every; all.”70
Thus, the plain meaning of section 16600 places no limits or specifi-
cations on the type of businesses to which it applies.  A student-
athlete plaintiff should urge courts to adopt an expansive interpre-
tation of profession, trade, or business that includes college athlet-
ics so that the court abides by the statute’s plain meaning and
effectuates the intent of the California legislature.  With that said, a
student-athlete plaintiff must contend with Townsend v. California,71
a 1987 case that describes California colleges and universities as
“not in the ‘business’ of” college athletics.72  At first glance, the case
seemingly undercuts a student-athlete’s argument that the court
should interpret business to include college athletics, but, upon
closer examination, Townsend does not foreclose that argument to
student-athletes.
In Townsend, the court addressed whether “a student-athlete is
an employee of the school he represents” to determine if the plain-
tiff, a college basketball player injured by an opposing player in an
in-game altercation, could recover monetary damages under the
California Tort Claims Act.73  To make that determination the
court examined “whether a master-servant relationship” existed be-
tween a student-athlete and the public college or university for
which he played.74  The court could not rely exclusively on tradi-
tional principles of agency law typically used to distinguish between
employees and independent contractors because “the relationship
between a school and a student-athlete is a unique one which prob-
ably does not fit neatly into” the employee versus independent con-
tractor dichotomy.75  Given the unique difficulties presented by
defining the relationship between a student-athlete and his or her
69. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019) (emphasis added).
70. Any, RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993).
71. 237 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
72. See id. at 149 (“Thus, conceptually, the colleges and universities maintain-
ing [football and basketball] programs are not in the ‘business’ of playing football
or basketball any more than they are in the ‘business’ of golf, tennis or
swimming.”).
73. See id. at 146–47.
74. Id. at 148 (noting “[a]pplicability of [respondeat superior] in any given
case . . . requires an individualized determination of whether a master-servant rela-
tionship exists between the tortfeasor and the defendant on which plaintiff seeks
to impose vicarious liability”).
75. Id.
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university, policy considerations factored heavily into the court’s
analysis.76
In its policy analysis, the court deduced that the state legisla-
ture excluded student-athletes from its definition of employee in
the California Labor Code “to prevent the student-athlete from be-
ing considered an employee of an educational institution for any
purpose which could result in financial liability on the part of the
university.”77  The court also reasoned that “conceptually, the col-
leges and universities maintaining . . . athletic programs are not in
the ‘business’ of playing” the sports it offers.78  Rather, college
sports “are simply part of an integrated multi-sport program which
is part of the education process.”79  These considerations, and the
court’s desire to effectuate legislative intent, resulted in the court
holding that the student-athlete tortfeasor “was not an employee of
the State or the university . . . .”80
Other California courts have reaffirmed Townsend’s holding
that colleges and universities do not employ student-athletes.81
Those cases have even cited Townsend’s observation that “concep-
tually, the colleges and universities maintaining [football and bas-
ketball] programs are not in the ‘business’ of” college athletics.”82
However, like Townsend, those cases address whether “a student-ath-
lete is an employee of the school he represents,” not whether col-
leges and universities are “in the ‘business’ of” operating a college
athletics program.83 Townsend’s declaration that colleges and uni-
versities with athletic programs “are not in the ‘business’ of” college
athletics amounts to nothing more than dicta about the “concep-
tual” nature of college sports over thirty years ago.84 Townsend’s ac-
tual holding does not answer the key question for a student-
76. See id. (“It is fair to state, however, that any determination of this issue [of
whether a master-servant relationship exists] . . . is affected by policy
considerations.”).
77. Id. at 149–50.
78. Id. at 149.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 150.
81. See, e.g., Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (ap-
plying California law), aff’d, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019); Shephard v. Loyola
Marymount Univ., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 832–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
82. See, e.g., Dawson, 250 F. Supp at 407–09; Shephard, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834.
83. Compare Townsend, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 147 with Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at
402–03 (determining whether student athletes are employees under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act) and Shephard, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (“[W]e address the question
of whether plaintiff was an employee for purposes of the [Fair Employment and
Housing Act].”).
84. Townsend, 237 Cal Rptr. at 149.
13
Stauser: Let the Kids Play: How College Athletes Can Use California's Proh
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS101.txt unknown Seq: 14  2-MAR-20 11:59
14 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27: p. 1
athlete’s challenge to the year-in-residence rule under section
16600—are college athletics a business?85
Judge Claudia Wilken’s 2014 decision in O’Bannon v. NCAA86
exemplifies why and how a court should refuse to allow outdated,
factually unsupported dicta to control its holding.87  In O’Bannon,
the NCAA attempted to justify its restrictions on student-athlete
compensation by citing dicta from the United States Supreme
Court’s 1984 decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of
Oklahoma88 that said, “[i]n order to preserve the character and qual-
ity of the ‘product,’ [of college football], athletes must not be paid
. . . .”89  Judge Wilken refused to allow that dicta to control her legal
analysis for numerous reasons.90  First, she noted that Board of Re-
gents “addressed limits on television broadcasting, not payments to
student-athletes . . . .”91  Second, Judge Wilken observed that “the
college sports industry has changed substantially in the thirty years
since Board of Regents was decided.”92  Finally, she wrote that “[t]he
Supreme Court’s suggestion in Board of Regents that, in order to pre-
serve the quality of the NCAA’s product, student-athletes ‘must not
be paid,’ . . . was not based on any factual findings in the trial re-
cord and did not serve to resolve any disputed facts of law.”93
Similar issues that led Judge Wilken to eschew reliance on the
Supreme Court’s dicta in Board of Regents should prompt a Califor-
nia court to abstain from using Townsend’s dicta to decide that Cali-
fornia universities are not engaged in a business.  First, the
California Court of Appeals decided Townsend in 1987, just three
years after the Supreme Court decided Board of Regents.94  As Judge
Wilken said, “the college sports industry has changed substantially”
since the mid-1980s.95  Indeed, other courts have also noted that
“in so-called revenue sports like Division I men’s basketball and FBS
[Football Bowl Subdivision] football . . . economic reality and the
tradition of amateurism may not point in the same direction” be-
85. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
86. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
87. See id. at 999–1000.
88. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
89. Id. at 102.
90. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (describing the NCAA’s reliance on
Board of Regents as “unavailing”).
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 999–1000.
93. Id. at 999 (internal citation omitted).
94. Compare note 72 with note 89 (cases decided three years apart). R
95. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
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cause “[t]hose sports involve billions of dollars of revenue for col-
leges and universities.”96  The California state legislature
highlighted the scale of these changes in the legislative findings sec-
tion in the original drafts of the recently enacted “Fair Pay to Play
Act.”97  Section 1 of those first drafts found that, inter alia, “the fair
market value of the labor of the average FBS football and men’s
basketball player was approximately $137,357 and $289,829, respec-
tively.”98  The proposal also noted that “California’s postsecondary
educational institutions that participate in intercollegiate athletics
generate over seven hundred million dollars ($700,000,000) per
year, which is revenue that would not exist without the efforts of
college athletes.”99  Prompted by California’s enactment of the Fair
Pay to Play Act and the rush by other states to pass similar legisla-
tion,100 the NCAA ostensibly reversed its longstanding opposition to
student-athlete compensation by announcing that it would allow
student-athletes “to profit from their name, image, and likenesses
‘in a manner consistent with the collegiate model.’”101
Additionally, the court in Townsend offered no factual evidence
about the actual nature of college sports to support its assertion,
just as the Supreme Court’s dicta in Board of Regents lacked factual
support.102  Furthermore, the Townsend court’s desire to effectuate
legislative intent by deciding that the student-athlete tortfeasor “was
not an employee of the State or the university” significantly affected
the case’s outcome.103  If a court interpreting section 16600 wanted
96. Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring).
97. See Proposed Fair Pay to Play Act, supra note 68. R
98. Id.
99. Id.  The California legislature removed that language in June of 2019 as
the bill worked its way toward passage. See California Senate Bill 206, LEGISCAN,
https://legiscan.com/CA/text/SB206/id/2055437 [https://perma.cc/73PN-
UXZG] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).  Upon passage, Section 1 read, “[i]t is the in-
tent of the Legislature to continue to develop policies to ensure appropriate pro-
tections are in place to avoid exploitation of student athletes, colleges, and
universities.”  S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as enacted).
100. See Craig Meyer, Pennsylvania Taking Steps Toward Its Own ‘Fair Pay to Play
Act’, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 1, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://www.post-gazette.
com/news/politics-state/2019/10/01/california-fair-pay-to-play-act-gavin-newsom-
pennsylvania/stories/201910010178 [https://perma.cc/HDR9-KCA6].
101. Dan Murphy, NCAA Clears Way for Athletes to Profit from Names, Images and
Likenesses, ESPN (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id
/27957981/ncaa-clears-way-athletes-profit-names-images-likenesses [https://
perma.cc/3V4A-NZ76].
102. Compare Townsend v. California, 237 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) with NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
103. See Townsend, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 149–50 (reasoning that the California leg-
islature’s amendment of the Labor Code to exclude student-athletes from the defi-
15
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to similarly implement the legislature’s intent behind section
16600, then it should not use Townsend’s dicta to quash a challenge
to the year-in-residence rule.  Doing so would not only thwart Cali-
fornia’s “settled public policy in favor of open competition,”104 but
it would also undermine the legislature’s clear desire over the last
ten years to expand legal protections for student-athletes.105
O’Bannon and other recent, high-profile challenges to NCAA
rules, including the year-in-residence rule, provide additional evi-
dence that college athletics is a business.106  For instance, in its
O’Bannon decision, the Ninth Circuit found that the NCAA “regu-
late[d] ‘commercial activity.’”107  The court noted that:
[T]he modern legal understanding of ‘commerce’ is
broad, ‘including almost every activity from which the ac-
tor anticipates economic gain’ . . . . That definition surely
encompasses the transaction in which an athletic recruit
exchanges his labor and [name, image, and likeness]
rights for a scholarship at a Division I school because it is
undeniable that both parties to that exchange anticipate
economic gain from it.108
The court held that the rules restricting student-athlete com-
pensation “relate to the NCAA’s business activities: the labor of stu-
dent-athletes is an integral and essential component of the NCAA’s
‘product,’ and a rule setting the price of that labor goes to the heart
of the NCAA’s business.”109  Though the court ultimately allowed
some restrictions on player compensation, it did so because the
nition of employee “evidenced an intent on the part of the Legislature to prevent
the student-athlete from being considered an employee of an educational institu-
tion for any purpose which could result in financial liability on the part of the
university”).
104. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 290 (Cal. 2008).
105. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67450 (West 2019) (Student Athlete Bill of
Rights); S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as enacted).
106. Federal courts’ willingness to view the NCAA and college athletics as a
business might prompt a student-athlete to file his section 16600 challenge to the
year-in-residence rule in federal court.  A federal court would have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the case would involve a California plaintiff and an
Indiana defendant. See Contacting the NCAA, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/contact-us [https://perma.cc/MF5V-
LF4R] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (showing that the NCAA’s national office is in
Indiana).
107. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2015) (describ-
ing the NCAA’s “claims that its compensation rules are mere ‘eligibility rules’ that
do not regulate any ‘commercial activity’” as “not credible”).
108. Id. at 1065 (internal citation omitted).
109. Id. at 1066 (emphasis added).
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NCAA persuaded it that limits on student-athlete compensation
preserved “the college football market” by promoting amateurism,
which made college athletics more appealing to consumers.110
The NCAA’s own briefs in the O’Bannon litigation also de-
scribed college athletics in commercial terms, revealing that the
NCAA and its member institutions operate athletic programs as
profit-driven businesses.  In its post-trial brief following the district
court’s O’Bannon decision,111 the NCAA defended its restrictions on
student-athlete compensation by arguing that those rules “create a
unique product—amateur college sports—that competes with
other forms of entertainment, including professional sports.”112
Thus, even the NCAA described college athletics as an entertain-
ment product in direct competition with other businesses.
Other antitrust cases have similarly exposed the NCAA and its
member institutions as involved in commercial activity—namely,
the promotion of the student-athlete-created product of college
athletics.  For instance, in In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Anti-
trust Litigation,113 Judge Wilken held that recruits “sell their athletic
services to the schools that participate in Division I basketball and
FBS football in exchange for grants-in-aid and other benefits and
compensation permitted by NCAA rules.”114  There the NCAA
again defended limits on player compensation as necessary to both
maintain consumer demand for the product of college sports and
prevent its revenues from decreasing.115  The NCAA’s need to pro-
tect the market for the product of college athletics also insulated
the year-in-residence rule from an antitrust challenge in Deppe v.
NCAA.116  There the Seventh Circuit upheld the year-in-residence
110. See id. at 1073–74.
111. See also NCAA v. O’Bannon, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016) denying cert. (No. 15-
1167), 2016 WL 3626736; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.
14-16601) 2015 WL 8004352.
112. Defendant NCAA’s Post-Trial Brief at 28, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp.
3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2015) (No. 4:09-CV-3329-CW), 2014 WL 3854062.
113. 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
114. Id. at 1067.  Like the plaintiffs in O’Bannon, the plaintiffs in Alston chal-
lenged the NCAA’s limits on student-athlete compensation under federal antitrust
law.  See id. at 1061–62.
115. See id. at 1070 (The NCAA “argue[s] that the challenged compensation
limits are procompetitive because ‘amateurism is a key part of demand for college
sports’ and ‘consumers value amateurism.’  The corollary is that if consumers did
not believe that student-athletes were amateurs, they would watch fewer games and
revenues would decrease as a result.” (internal citation omitted)).
116. See Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 503 (7th Cir. 2018).
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rule because “the NCAA needs ‘ample latitude’ to preserve the prod-
uct of college sports.”117
These recent antitrust cases show that, when it suits them, the
NCAA argues that it and its member institutions actively engage in
a market for student-athletes’ “athletic services” so that they can
produce “the product of college sports” and generate revenue for
itself and its member institutions.118  This is quintessential business
activity.  California courts should steadfastly reject the NCAA’s at-
tempts to claim otherwise simply because it is legally expedient.
2. College Athletes Engage in the Lawful Business of College Athletics by
Playing College Sports
Even if a court held that college athletics was a business, the
NCAA could argue that student-athletes do not “engage” in the bus-
iness of college athletics and that section 16600 does not apply be-
cause colleges and universities do not employ student-athletes.119
Indeed, most section 16600 cases involve employees,120 and state
and federal courts in California have reaffirmed that colleges and
universities do not employ student-athletes.121  However, a Califor-
nia court should reject this argument because section 16600 does
not apply only when an employee-employer relationship exists.122
Rather, the statute applies to “every contract by which anyone is re-
strained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind.”123  It does not exclusively regulate contracts that restrain
employees, nor does it exclusively regulate contracts that restrain
someone from becoming an employee.
To determine what section 16600 means by “engaging in a law-
ful . . . business of any kind,“124 a court should examine the statute’s
plain meaning.125  The dictionary defines “engage” as “occupy[ing]
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See notes 106–07 and 109 and accompanying text. R
119. See, e.g., Epstein & Anderson, supra note 36, at 297 (noting that “courts R
have been consistent finding that student-athletes are not recognized as employees
under any legal standard”).
120. But see Youngevity Int’l, Corp. v. Smith, 224 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1032 (S.D.
Cal. 2016) (holding that section 16600 applies to both independent contractors
and employees).
121. See Dawson v. NCAA, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 932
F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019); Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d
829, 832–36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
122. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019); Youngevity Int’l, Corp.,
224 F. Supp. 3d at 1032.
123. BUS. & PROF. § 16600 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. R
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the attention or efforts of (a person or persons).”126 Because col-
lege sports occupy the attention and efforts of student-athletes, the
plain meaning of the statute makes clear that student-athletes en-
gage in the business of college athletics.  Both common sense and
case law support this understanding.  As the Ninth Circuit held in
O’Bannon, “the labor of student-athletes is an integral and essential
component of the NCAA’s ‘product . . . .’”127  Simply put, without
student-athletes, the NCAA’s business does not exist; student-ath-
letes directly create the product that the NCAA sells.128  Indeed, the
California state legislature initially proposed the Fair Pay to Play Act
in part because the state’s colleges and universities “generate over
seven hundred million dollars” annually from intercollegiate athlet-
ics, “which is revenue that would not exist without the efforts of
college athletes.”129  Therefore, section 16600’s plain meaning, case
law, and recent legislative findings all suggest that a court should
hold that student-athletes engage in the business of college
athletics.130
B. The Year-In-Residence Rule Restrains Student-Athletes from
Engaging in College Athletics
To successfully challenge the year-in-residence rule under sec-
tion 16600, student-athletes must prove that the year-in-residence
rule restrains them from engaging in college athletics by forcing
126. Engage, RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993).
127. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2015); see
also Darren Geeter, March Madness Makes Enough Money to Nearly Fund the Entire
NCAA—Here’s How, CNBC (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/03/22/ncca-march-madness-tournament-basketball.html [https://perma.
cc/8J8U-K7EF] (“The NCAA’s Division I men’s basketball tournament draws in
millions of viewers and rakes in more than $800 million each year from its televi-
sion deal alone.”); Brent Schrotenboer, How College Football Playoff and Bowl Game
System Mix Socialism, Capitalism, USA TODAY (Dec. 14, 2017, 7:42 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2017/12/14/college-football-bowl-game-revenue-
sharing/952646001/ [https://perma.cc/Z8JD-S65U] (reporting that NCAA “con-
ferences and schools combined for $517 million in bowl profit” in 2016).
128. See generally O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049; Greeter, supra note 127; Schroten- R
boer, supra note 127. R
129. See Proposed Fair Pay to Play Act, supra note 68; see also Cork Gaines & R
Mike Nudelman, Why the NCAA May Eventually Be Forced to Pay Some Student Athletes,
In One Chart, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 24, 2017, 4:51 PM), https://www.businessin
sider.com/college-football-player-value-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/25Q8-HDWZ]
(showing that “the average FBS player is worth $163,087 a year, with the average
football team making $29.5 million in revenue each year”).
130. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008)
(“[W]e are of the view that California courts ‘have been clear in their expression
that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the state which should not
be diluted by judicial fiat.’” (quoting Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 732 F. Supp.
1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1990))).
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them to not compete in intercollegiate athletics for one academic
year after transferring.131  Although the year-in-residence rule cer-
tainly limits a student-athletes’ participation in intercollegiate ath-
letics, the NCAA will likely argue that the rule does not “restrain”
student-athletes because they can freely transfer and can still prac-
tice with their team during the year-in-residence.132  The NCAA
might also tout the supposed benefits of the rule by arguing that
the year-in-residence allows transfer students “to become comforta-
ble in [their] new environment”133 and prevents schools from trad-
ing student-athletes “from year to year like professional athletes.”134
Finally, the NCAA might contend that preventing a student-athlete
from competing in intercollegiate athletics for one year does not
restrain him or her from engaging in college athletics because it
provides a temporally-limited restriction on only one part of the
intercollegiate athletic experience.
However, these arguments should fail because California
courts have repeatedly refused to create exceptions to section
16600, even for reasonable, narrow, and time-limited restraints on
competition.  Although the year-in-residence rule permits transfer-
ring student-athletes to participate in some aspects of intercollegi-
ate athletics, the California Supreme Court has considered and
explicitly rejected “interpret[ing] the term ‘restrain’ under section
16600 to mean simply to ‘prohibit,’ so that only contracts that to-
tally prohibit an employee from engaging in his or her profession,
trade, or business are illegal.”135  Even “reasonably based” and “nar-
rowly tailored” restraints on an individual’s ability to engage in “his
131. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
132. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2018–19 GUIDE FOR FOUR-YEAR
TRANSFERS, at 16 (2018), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/product
downloads/TGONLINE42018.pdf [https://perma.cc/443U-349U] (last visited
Jan. 28, 2020).
133. Id.  The NCAA Division I manual does not explain why FBS football,
basketball, baseball, and men’s hockey players need a year to become comfortable
at their new school, while other students do not.  However, one scholar astutely
noted that the rule makes it so that “schools’ most lucrative athletes are heavily
disincentivized from taking their talents elsewhere, while ‘non-revenue’ sport ath-
letes can transfer more freely.” See Miller, supra note 14.
134. See Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 502–03 (7th Cir. 2018)  (“Without
[the year-in-residence rule] student-athletes could be ‘traded’ from year to year
like professional athletes.”).  If the NCAA abolished the year-in-residence rule, stu-
dent-athletes could transfer and immediately play at their new school.  It does not
follow, however, that college or universities could directly control when and if a
player decided to transfer schools or that they could force a student-athlete to
transfer in exchange for the athletic services of another student-athlete.
135. See Edwards, 189 P.3d at 291.
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or her profession, trade, or business” violate section 16600.136
Thus, the supposed benefits of the year-in-residence rule and its
narrow prohibition on only one aspect of participation in intercol-
legiate athletics will not prevent it from running afoul of section
16600.  Likewise, the year-in-residence rule’s temporal limitation
will not save it because California courts have invalidated noncom-
pete clauses that restrain competition for only one year.137  Ulti-
mately, the reluctance of California courts to create exceptions to
section 16600 absent legislative guidance makes it unlikely that the
NCAA would succeed in arguing that the year-in-residence rule
does not restrain student-athletes from engaging in college
athletics.
C. An Exception to Section 16600 Does Not (and Should Not)
Apply to the NCAA’s Year-In-Residence Rule
Finally, for a student-athlete’s challenge to the year-in-resi-
dence rule to succeed, he or she must prove that an exception to
section 16600 does not apply.138  Sections 16601, 16602, and
16602.5 delineate the only three exceptions to section 16600.139
Section 16601 permits “noncompetition agreements in the sale or
dissolution of corporations;”140 section 16602 permits “noncompeti-
tion agreements in the sale or dissolution of . . . partnerships;”141
and section 16602.5 permits “noncompetition agreements in the
sale or dissolution of . . . limited liability corporations.”142  None of
these exceptions apply to the year-in-residence rule.  Additionally,
courts have refused to create exceptions to section 16600, instead
“leav[ing] it to the Legislature, if it chooses, either to relax the stat-
utory restrictions or adopt additional exceptions to the prohibition-
against-restraint rule under section 16600.”143
136. See id.
137. See id. at 291–92 (invalidating a noncompete agreement that prevented a
former employee from “providing professional services” to any of the organiza-
tion’s clients for a year after his termination.); see also Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v.
Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 576–80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (invali-
dating a restrictive covenant under § 16600 because it prevented former employ-
ees from working for a business’s competitor “for one year following
termination”).
138. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
139. BUS. & PROF. §§ 16601, 16602, 16602.5; Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290–91.
140. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290.
141. Id. at 290–91.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 293. In Edwards, the  California Supreme Court shared its view
“that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the state which should not
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Given the reluctance of California courts to create exceptions
to section 16600 “by judicial fiat,” the NCAA would need to con-
vince the California state legislature to create an exception to sec-
tion 16600 that would permit the year-in-residence rule.144  Such an
effort seems unlikely to succeed for two reasons.  First, the Califor-
nia state legislature has a “settled public policy in favor of open
competition,” as evidenced by its creation of only three exceptions
to its prohibition on noncompete clauses since 1872.145  Second,
recent legislative developments show that California’s legislators
want to expand, not contract, student-athletes’ rights.146  For in-
stance, in 2019, California enacted legislation that would allow stu-
dent-athletes to benefit from the sale of their name, image, and
likeness.147  Additionally, in 2011, the state enacted the Student
Athletes Bill of Rights, which drastically expanded the rights of Cali-
fornia’s student-athletes.148
Policy considerations also militate against creating a year-in-res-
idence-rule exception to section 16600. Such an exception would
perpetuate a dramatically unfair system where coaches can leave for
better paying or more prestigious jobs without any negative reper-
cussions while student-athletes must remain at their school or re-
ceive what amounts to a one-year suspension.149  The rule’s
be diluted by judicial fiat.” Id. at 293 (quoting Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc.,
732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).
144. Id. (quoting Snelling, 732 F. Supp. at 1042).
145. Id. at 290; see also Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 154 (Cal. 1993)
(“California has a settled policy in favor of open competition.”); Kelton v. Stravin-
ski, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 877, 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“California has a settled policy
in favor of open competition.  Accordingly, the general rule is that covenants not
to compete are void.” (internal citations omitted)).
146. See, e.g., S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as enacted).
147. See id.
148. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 67450–53 (West 2019).  Federal legislation to pro-
tect the year-in-residence rule seems equally unlikely because the movement to
treat student-athletes more equitably has generated bipartisan support.  A bill pro-
posed by a Republican this year in the House of Representatives “would allow
NCAA student-athletes to profit from the use of their name, likeness and image.”
Jenna West, Congressman to Introduce Bill to Let NCAA Athletes Profit From Use of the
Their Name, Likeness, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.si.com/col
lege-basketball/2019/03/07/ncaa-student-athletes-profit-name-use-bill-introduced
-mark-walker [https://perma.cc/C2Y6-FPJK].  In the Senate, Connecticut Demo-
crat Chris Murphy plans to release a series of reports “that will consider a range of
problems with college athletics.”  Chris Murphy, Madness, Inc., at 13 (2019), availa-
ble at https://www.murphy.senate.gov/download/madness-inc [https://perma.cc/
JY2F-6JTJ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
149. See Angelique S. Chengelis, “It’s Incredibly Simple”: Let Transfers Play Right
Away, Advocates Argue, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 23, 2019, 7:39 PM), https://www.detroit
news.com/story/sports/college/2019/01/23/transfers-let-them-play-right-away-ad
vocates-argue/2644360002/ [https://perma.cc/5RKF-535F]; Tom Fornelli, College
Football Coaching Changes Carousel: Grades, Breakdowns for New 2018-19 Hires, CBS
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applicability to student-athletes in just five sports further highlights
its absurdity.150  The NCAA’s argument that football players need a
year-in-residence after transferring, but lacrosse players do not
should not persuade any legislator to protect the year-in-residence
rule.  Moreover, any legislative judgment about the merits of the
year-in-residence rule must recognize that the rule inflicts real, sub-
stantial harm on student-athletes when it prevents them from re-
ceiving scholarships that they otherwise had the athletic talent to
earn.151  Finally, the legislature should not provide legal protections
for a system that allows the NCAA, colleges and universities, admin-
istrators, and coaches to make millions of dollars while student-ath-
letes receive nothing more than a scholarship.152  Even if the state
legislature will not or cannot end the artificial suppression of stu-
dent-athlete compensation, it need not compound that injustice by
perpetuating a system that limits the opportunities for student-ath-
letes to showcase their talents and make the most of the slim
chance they have to compete professionally and capitalize economi-
cally on their athletic talent.153
V. CONCLUSION
Student-athletes have repeatedly challenged the NCAA’s year-
in-residence rule to no avail.154  Despite these repeated losses, the
law does, in fact, give student-athletes in California an opportunity
to circumvent the year-in-residence rule’s onerous prohibition on
immediate eligibility for transfer students.  Student-athletes can
challenge the year-in-residence rule as a violation of section 16600
of the California Business and Professions Code, a statute that for-
bids noncompete agreements.  This strategy, like any, does not
guarantee the demise of the year-in-residence rule, but for student-
athletes like Bru McCoy, such a strategy is a risk worth taking.
SPORTS (Dec. 16, 2018, 8:45 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/
news/college-football-coaching-changes-carousel-grades-breakdowns-for-new-2018-
19-hires/ [https://perma.cc/TLJ2-JJE7].
150. See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 5, at 183–85.
151. See, e.g., Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 499–500 (7th Cir. 2018).
152. See, e.g., Proposed Fair Pay to Play Act, supra note 68; Murphy, supra note R
148; Brian Rosenberg, Opinion, How the N.C.A.A. Cheats Student Athletes, N.Y. TIMES R
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/opinion/how-the-ncaa-
cheats-student-athletes.html [https://perma.cc/W949-JMFR].
153. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA RECRUITING FACTS (2018),
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Recruiting%20Fact%20Sheet%20WEB.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5JGG-VKNH] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (estimating that
approximately two percent of college athletes play in a major professional league).
154. See Miller, supra note 14.
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